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I. Introduction 
The Philippines represents a fascinating case of the complex, evolving 
interactions between the financial system and the economic development 
process. However, the causal relationships between the two are obscure; 
financial and other data are not available; and differences between 
appearance and reality abound. We focus on the development of the private 
domestic commercial banking system from independence in 1946 to 1980, in 
light of Japan's historical experience. 
While a few banks had been established in the colonial period, in-
dependence inaugurated a new era in financial development. The major 
policy-induced changes in financial structure and liberalization of 
interest rates in 1980, and the structural effects of the unexpected 
and generally unrelated financial crisis of 1981, may herald the begin­
ning of a new era in Philippine financial development. 
As in other nations, commercial banks play a key role in Philippine 
financial development. Our main emphasis is the evolving structure of 
the banking system in the context of its dynamic, but rather unstable and 
uneven growth. We are concerned both with issues of industrial organization--
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the nature of competition, the structure of ownership, degree of 
specialization of function, relations with borrowers--and with bank 
performance. Of particular interest is the role of banks as part of 
family-owned groups of companies, analogous to prewar Japan's zaibatsu. 
Government policy has been of paramount importance in shaping the 
structure and growth of the banking system, and indeed of specific 
banks. The government regulates entry requirements, types of financial 
services allowed, minimum capital requirements, and the like, and main­
tained nominal interest rate ceilings on deposits and loans. Inflationary 
pressures in this restrictive policy environment substantially affected 
bank behavior and performance. Beyond this, government emphasis on 
import-substituting economic development has determined the overall 
economic environment. 
This study is based on a variety of Philippine sources, published 
and unpublished. We have benefitted from some access to materials of the 
Central Bank, Securities Exchange Commission, and other government 
agencies. We have learned much about the actual nature and behavior 
of the private commercial banking system through extensive interviews with 
experts in the financial community. The Philippines is a country where 
much is known by a relatively small elite but little is published, even 
more so during the institution of Marital Law between September 1972 and 
January 1981. 
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Comparison With Japanese Financial Development 
The development and growth of banking face common issues and problems 
in all market-oriented economies. As a former colony, the Philippine 
financial system has been based on the American toodel of specialized 
types of financial institutions engaged in a variety of specialized 
financial activities. Comparative analysis of the Philippine financial 
system and the commercial banking system has thus been mainly in terms 
of United States practice and experience. However, there are also 
substantial.differences between the respective processes and patterns 
of economic and financial development. And, there are certain striking 
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Philippine similarities with the financial development of Japan. 
Between 1868 and 1905 Japan experienced the initial creation and 
integration of a financial system under government sponsorship (termed 
supply-leading). From 1905 to 1937, development, growth and increasing 
diversification of the financial system was in a relatively free market 
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environment (d~mand-following). Throughout the prewar period the 
family-owned industrial, financial and connnercial conglomerates (the 
zaibatsu) and their relations with large banks were increasingly 
significant. 
In many respects postwar Philippine financial and economic develop­
ment is similar, with some time compression, to Japan's two prewar 
phases. The 1946-1980 period may be divided into two sub-eras. The 
first two decades remind one of Meiji Japan in the ease of creating new 
banks and other financial institutions and consequent expansion in their 
numbers, the opting for specialized rather than general-purpose in­
stitutions, and government and central bank stimulus including 
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government deposits and other official credit. And since the mid-1960s 
Philippine development is similar to Japan's second phase: the growing 
role of industrial activity; the rise in family-owned groups of compan­
ies; the growth and diversification of the financial system even as 
financial dualism persisted h;ttdecreased; bank runs, panics, and failures; 
efforts to strengthen the banking system by increasing minimum capital 
requirements, making new entry difficult, and encouraging bank merger; 
and the development of fairly widespread branch banking on a national 
basis. 
Still other features appear more like Japan's post~World War II 
phase--notably the significant amount of central bank credit directly to 
the banks; and the maintenance of low inter~st rate ceilings which re­
sulted, among other things, in a high concentration of Japanese major 
bank loans to large enterprises, some degree of erosion of national 
interest rates by compensating balances and other means, and retarded 
growth of the bond market. In contrast to the Philippines, financial 
intermediation has been quite successful in postwar Japan despite 
the system of interest rate controls because the Japanese financial 
system was highly developed and its structure very stable, personal 
saving rates became extremely high, low-risk assets alternative to 
saving deposits were not readily available to the predominantly urban 
population, and business investment demand was far stronger than could 
be financed from internal or private sources. 
The level of financial development in the Philippines, as measured 
by the ratios of financial assets to GNP and~ to GNP, in the late 1970s 
was below that of Japan at the turn of the century--while the levels 
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of income per capita may have been roughly comparable. A 
major contrast is between Japan's prewar policy of free interest 
rates and market-clearing financial markets and the Philippine 
policy of regulated interest rates and credit rationing to clear 
markets. We hypothesize this policy difference has been a major 
cause of lagging Philippine financial development relative to 
Japan's historical experience. 
Comparison between earlier Japanese experience and the con­
temporary Philippine commercial banking system must be done flexibly. 
The Philippine era considered here combines both supply-leading 
and demand-following elements, and in some respects combines 
the experience of Japan's first two phases. In this spirit, Japan's 
successes and failures in financial policy and in development of the 
financial system can provide insights for Philippine policy makers. 
Further, as discussed below, the similarities between Philippine 
financial-commercial-industrial family groups and Japanese prewar 
zaibatsu are notable; their implications for financial and economic 
development are less clear, though certainly they have served to con­
centrate economic and political power. 
II. The Financial Environment 
The development of the financial system has been concomitant 
with that of the Philippine economy. Indicators of the performance 
3
of the Philippine economy are provided in Table 1. 
Balance of payments problems and excessive rates of inflation, 
especially in the oil crises of 1974-?5 and 1979-80, have on occasion 
forced the Central Bank to take restrictive credit policies which 
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have resulted in very tight domestic financial markets (Bautista, 
1980). While production, finance, and financial institutions occur 
throughout the Philippines' many islands and their major regional 
subcomponents, the predominance of Metro Manila is striking. This 
highly congested metropolitan area contains 13 percent of the 
nation's population yet produces one-third of the gross national 
product, and contains more than half the nation's industrial 
activity. The bulk of commercial bank activities, including 
virtually all head offices, is in Metro Manila. 
Over most of the postwar period the government has pursued 
an economic development strategy based mainly on import-substituting 
industrialization and the continued development of traditional exports 
crops (sugar, copra, timber) and mining.• In the early 1980s the 
government began moving toward a more export-oriented industrialization policy. 
The degree of government intervention in the economy is substantial; 
instruments include direct controls (over imports, prices of key 
domestic consumption goods, interest rates) as well as subsidies 
and other preferences (such as credit allocation at loJ interest 
rates) to priority sectors and activities. These policies, together 
with fundamental features of the economy,such as surplus labor and 
capital market dualism, mean relative prices for many goods and 
factors of production differ substantially from world prices or 
shadow prices in equilibrium. 
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The Group Form of Industrial Organization 
One bf the most important. and fascinating, aspects of 
Philippine economic structure is the group form of organization 
of large-scale business. The turbulent rise and spread of suc­
cessive waves of Philippine groups over the past three decades is 
reminiscent of Japanese zaibatsu between the early 1900s 
and World War II. This "Japanese phenomenon" seems to be an 
important, if poorly studied, characteristic of the industrialization 
4process in many developing countries. 
Typically a group is owned by one family, often including various 
branches with different names; however in the Philippines some groups 
are .owned and controlled by several closely associated individuals 
or families. Unfortunately even imprecise data about groups are scanty. 
One of the few quite open about its membership is the First Holdings 
Group; it listed its member companies in newspaper advertisements in 
February 1980 giving information on telephone numbers and office 
location. This group was established in the early 1970s by taking 
over the operations and various subsidiaries of Meralco (Manila 
Electric Company) from the Lopez family. 
There are alternative forms of group-centralization organization: 
holding company; operating conglomerate; management company; or in­
house management groups. In the Philippines the predominant forms 
are management companies and in-house management groups. (For a 
brief description, including a listing of the top 13 management 
companies, see SEC-Business Day, 1978, pp. 173-81.) Whether 
personally managed by the owning family members or by hired 
professional managers, close personal relationships based in 
part on ethnicity or region of birth are a central feature of 
Philippine groups. 
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SEC-Business Day (1978) has identified some 47 private business 
groups as of 1977. Doherty (1979) and (1980) has identified some 
89 major individuals and families who form the basis of the main 
groups. By listing the interlocking directorates of banks and 
companies, he concludes alliances that comprise "ten groups con-
nected with the commercial banks dominate the Philippine business 
world" (Doherty 1980, chapter S). Some 23 of the 28 domestic 
commercial banks (including the two government commercial banks) 
are members of these ten groups. One problem with using inter­
locking directorships to define and classify groups, as Doherty 
recognises, is that control cannot be inferred. However it is 
reasonable to assume patterns and channels of cooperation, at the least. 
The families and their economic groups are involved in a 
dynamic process. There have been several waves entering the oligarchy, 
and a few washed out. The oldest and most established--such as the 
Zobel-Ayala and the Soriano--date back to the Spanish era. Others 
became important during the early American period. Still others 
emerged following independence, as the government encouraged import­
substituting industrialization. And a new wave emerged under martial 
law in the 1970s. Before World War II, families were eased mainly 
in agriculture, mining, and associated commerce, while more recently 
industry and finance have become important. Beginning with the 
Spanish, there has been a close, two-way relationship between economic 
and political power; government and big business (that is, major 
families) have been closely intertwined. 
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Doherty (1980> Chapter 5) classifies the major families into 
three groups. 
" •••Among the 89 families, some exercise much greater 
control than others. Among these are the new elite 
who have risen to prominence since the declaration of 
martial law. They are Disini-Velayo, Benedicto, 
Conjuangco-Enrile, Silverio, Cuenca, Abella, Oreta, 
Tantoco, Ozaeta and Floirendo •••Others, though con­
sidered among the premartial law traditional elite, 
have also grown significantly under martial law due 
to connections ••• Among them would be Sycip, Yuchengco, 
Yulo, Elizalde, Aboitiz, Alcantara, J.B. Fernandez, 
Nubla, Siguion-Reyna, S. Valdez, Palanca and Jose 
Concepcion. 
There is a third group. They-are also part of the 
old traditional elite•••Though they are still a sig­
nificant group and in general have managed to hold 
their own under martial law, they have done so despite 
periodic harassment. This group would include such 
names as Soriano, Zobel-Ayala, J.A. Araneta, Cabarrus, 
J.P. Fernandez, Madrigal-Olondriz, C. Ledesma, Laurel 
and Ortigas. Though they may not be happy with develop­
ments at present> they know that if they express this 
unhappiness too freely, they can go the way of the 
Lopezes and find their investments expropriated." 
The groups are important for our analysis because of their 
close, complex, rather heterogeneous sets of relationships with 
the commercial banks. These involvements can be viewed from the 
perspective of either the banking system or the group system. Some 
groups grew out of family-owned banks; others started banks; some 
have no direct ownership-control relationship. The 21 largest 
groups were affiliated with 10 banks; 5 were identified 
as having no close bank affiliation. Several banks are identified 
with two or more groups, in particular Far East Bank and Trust 
Company (FEBTC). Almost all banks were started by one or two 
families; almost all those families appear on the list of 47 groups. 
-10-
Then Central Bank Governor, Gregario Licaros, may have been only 
mildly exaggerating when he said "the average Filipino banker is 
in the banking business not for banking profits; he uses his bank 
for allied business" (FEER, April 7, 1978, p. 80). 
The Financial System 
Table 2 provides a summary description of the organized financial 
system before the 1980-81 reforms had substantial effect. 5 As in the 
U.S., the system was founded on specialization: different types of 
financial institutions, under different laws and regulations, 
to meet specific financial functions. In practice in both countries 
commercial banks, directly and through subsidiaries or affiliates, 
provide a wide range of services. Thrift banks collect savings 
and time deposits, and make commercial and mortgage loans; they have 
had no demand deposits. Rural banks collect time and saving 
deposits and make loans predominantly for agriculture. Mainly 
unit banks, they are widely dispersed throughout the country, 
are heavily subsidized by the Central Bank, and are little m:>re 
than conduits for central bank and government credit. Their 
development resembles that of Japanese local banks initially 
(see Teranishi, this volume). 
Government financial institutions are important; they hold 
about two-fifths of the total assets of the financial system. Their 
lending activities are widespread; they are heavily involved in 
lending to priority sectors, however defined. Most of their funds, 
including deposits, come from governmental sources. The main 
government institutions are the Philippine National Bank (PNB), the 
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), the Land Bank, the Government Service 
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Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social Security System (SSS). 
The Development Bank of the Philippines has a significant role, 
not just because of its size but also because it has few substitutes. 
It provides 47 percent of the long-term loans and 15 percent of 
medium-term loans in the Philippines; 71 percent of its loans are to 
industry (IMF-World Bank Mission Report, pp. 43-45). DBP is essentially 
a conduit for government domestic funds, and for loans from such 
international agencies as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. 
The Philippine National Bank is by far the largest connnercial 
bank; in 1980 it held 31 percent of the commercial banking system's, 
and 16 percent of the entire financial system's assets. Established 
in 1916, it earlier had some central bank functions including 
acting as the 
currency issue and/fiscal agent for the government. In part because 
of overdue loans to government corporations, PNB was in serious 
trouble in the early 1970s. A special governmental study (Joint 
IMF-CBP Report, 1972) concluded PNB should be assisted in order to 
"perform its role as a tool of government policy" (p. 106). PNB 
plays "a special role not performed by private commercial banks, that 
of an instrument of national monetary policy. It is also called 
upon to finance highly risky ventures, to provide loans for food 
production, agricultural production, and industry, and to make loans 
to the government, its political subdivisions and instrumentalities" 
{pp. 105-6). While the structure of costs and net returns on loans 
and investments evidently do not differ significantly from private 
commercial banks (Saito and Villanueva, 1978, #49), PNB apparently 
lends particularly to those industrial groups which have risen in 
power over the past decade. It, together with the DBP, lent actively 
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to them in 1981, and took substantial equity and operating control 
of a number of their companies, in the 1981 financial crisis. 
Commercial banks hold almost three-fifths of the assets of the 
financial system, a ratio comparable to Japan in the 1920s. The 
system has three elements: two government conunercial banks; 
branches of four foreign banks (Citibank, Bank of America, Hong 
Kong and Shanghai Bank, and Chartered Bank); and 26 private domestic 
banks. The main focus of this study is the private domestic banks, 
which together comprise cme-third of the entire financial system. 
Citibank, with a long history in the Philippines, was second in 
size only to PNB until 1978; but by 1980 three private domestic 
commercial banks had more assets. While foreign banks are not allowed to 
open new branches, they have been innovative in developing finance companies, 
leasing companies, and other financial subsidiaries. They have superior access 
to foreign funds within the policy constraints of swap limits set by 
the Central Bank. Generally subject to the same domestic regulatory 
environment as the private domestic banks, they are also subject to 
the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. They have tended to finance 
foreign trade, multinational companies, and the 300 largest industrial 
corporations. 
Financial intermediation has grown over time, absolutely and, 
more importantly, relatively. Assets of the entire financial 
system were 48 percent of GNP in 1960, 72 percent in 1970, 86 percent 
6
in 1977, and 90 percent in 1980. Similarly, relative to GNP, the 
total assets of commercial banks were 16 percent in 1950, 17 percent 
in 1960, 34 percent in 1975, and 52 percent in 1980; their.time and 
-13-
saving deposits relative to GNP rose similarly but less sharply-­
from 4 percent in 1950, 7 percent in 1960, 13 percent in 1970, 12 
percent in 1975, to 23 percent in 1980. Demand deposits moved 
erratically downward, from 8 percent in 1950, 6 percent in 1960 and 
1970, to 5 percent in 1980. The substantial difference between 
asset and deposit ratios reflectsthe use of deposit substitutes, 
central bank credit, and foreign currency swap arrangements, as well 
as net worth. The ratios of commercial bank assets to GNP for Japan 
were substantially higher, 24.6 percent in 1885, 34.6 percent in 1900, 
53.1 percent in 1913, 63.7 percent in 1920, and 107.3 percent in 1930. 
The Philippines now has a sophisticated system of connnercial banks 
and other financial institutions, with highly sophisticated and 
responsive short-term money markets. The system is innovative 
and on the whole well-developed. Yet this is too sanguine. The 
financial system itself has been subject off and on to serious 
difficulties. Emery noted of the late 1960s, "the Philippines 
has probably had more financial scandals or financial institutions 
in distress than any other Southeast Asian country" (Emery, 1970, p. 482). 
Problems were particularly severe in the 1960s and early 1970s and 
again in early 1981. Open-end mutual funds were started, and then 
collapsed. A number of savings and loan associations, finance 
companies, insurance companies, and investment houses have been 
in trouble at one time or another. The commercial banking system 
has been particularly vulnerable and unstable, with several bank 
runs, and a few bank failures. 
Perhaps more serious, the financial system has not developed 
fully or evenly, either in the provision of medium-to-long-term 
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credit for investors or credit to small borrowers in agriculture, 
commerce, and industry. Financial dualism persists. The clearest 
indicators of this are in access to funds by category of borrower 
(such as size or nature of enterprise), and differentials in 
interest rates on borrowed funds substantially in excess of admin-
.istrative costs and default risks. Teranishi (1981) notes govern-
ment-subsidized credit programs have substantially reduced the role of 
traditional finance in agriculture. However most small-scale producers, 
especially outside agriculture, continue to rely on family, friends, 
money-lenders, and other traditional forms of credit. In Japan, 
financial dualism persisted, even as it diminished, until after 
World War II (Teranishi and Patrick, 1977; Patrick, 1982). The 
speed with which dualistic differentials decrease depends on 
interest rate policies and on modern financial system development. 
The Role of the Monetary Authorities 
The financial environment is very much determined by the 
policies and regulations of the monetary authorities, notably the 
Central Bank of the Philippines. Like central banks in many 
developing countries, it has three main goals. One is macro 
stabilization of the economy, using control of high-powered money, 
the money supply, credit availability, and interest rates. A 
second objective is long-run economic development. To this end 
the Central Bank allocates credit to priority sectors through pre­
ferential terms (availability and low interest rates) for the rediscount 
of certain types of paper, restrictions on commercial bank portfolios, 
and provision of credit to government financial institutions, rural 
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Third is healthy growth of the financialbanks and the like. 
system and its constituent individual institutions through 
regulation, 
control, and inspection. Under the financial reforms propo
sed to 
the Legislature in 1972 and subsequently implemented under 
Martial 
Law, a great deal of discretionary power devolved on the C
entral Bank. 
One persistent feature of the past two decades has been the
 
substantial amount of credit provided by the Central Bank t
o 
commercial banks through loans and rediscounts. This has i
ts 
analogy ·in postwar Japan, where city banks engaged in subs
tantial 
Loans and rediscounts are"overloan" from the Bank of Japan. 
part of a complex pattern of credit flows with the commercia
l 
banks, involving also reserve requirements, commercial bank
 pur­
chase of Central Bank Certificates of Indebtedness (CBCis, 
analogous to Treasury bills), and required holdings of gov
ernment 
bonds in asset portfolios. 
One key issue has been the allocation of central bank cred
it, 
in its various forms, among the commercial banks. One imp
ortant, 
and at times highly profitable, source of borrowed funds h
as been 
through swap arrangements. A commercial bank obtains a for
eign 
currency loan or deposit, converts the currency (typically 
dollars) 
into pesos, and purchases forward dollars at a favorable ra
te 
from the Central Bank. These transactions must be approved
 by 
Control over large amounts of rediscounts andthe Central Bank. 
even modest amounts of swaps has been centralized at the h
ighest 
levels; apparently Gregario Licaros, who headed the Centra
l Bank 
until his resignation in early 1981, personally approved e
very 
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swap transaction over $1 million. While stated criteria exist, 
the actual rules and procedures for allocation of credit have not 
been clear. The amounts obtained by individual banks have varied 
widely. Favoritism, rather than equal opportunity of access to 
Central Bank credit by objective criteria> seems important. 
The type of interest rate system--market-determined or controlled-­
has profound implications for implementation of stabilization policy, 
proootion of saving and channelling it to the most productive 
investment uses, and for the development of a healthy and 
effective financial system. The theoretical case for market­
determined interest rates is strong. -Nonetheless, one of most 
important policies pursued by the Central Bank until 1981 was to 
set maximum interest rates on time and savings deposits, loans, 
discounts, and money market instruments (deposit substitutes). 
A government study in 1972 made a sensible, sophisticated analysis 
of the problems caused by a system of rigid, low interest rates 
and the misallocations of credit that result, and made a strong 
argument for a flexible interest rate policy (Inter-Agency Committee 
on the Study of Interest Rates, 1972, p. 17). Finally, in July 
1981 such a policy was partially adopted. Until then, 
and exacerbated during periods of rapid inflation, the interest 
rate ceilings had strongly negative effects on regular financial 
markets. 
Market rates for loans and discounts were below ceiling rates 
until about 1960. Since then, however, it appears that most of 
the time the equilibrium rate has been higher than the ceiling for 
loans, at times substantially. While data on profits and profit-
ability of investment are poor, a 'real return of 15 to 20 
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percent seems likely (see Ranis et al., 1974, and Tan, 1979). 
However, with inflation accelerating in the 1970s, especially in 
the 1970-74 and 1979-80 periods, actual real returns on deposits 
and some loans were lower, at times even negative (Table J). 
The capital market has remained undeveloped despite the early 
creation and active role of investment houses designed to make 
medium and long-term placements and to underwrite new securities 
issues. Although some 5,000 new companies register with the S.E.C. 
each year. virtually none are public. Only 58 of the top 1.000 
industrial corporations are listed on stock exchanges, and a dozen 
of those listed issues are not traded. New issues do not average 
more than 30 per year. The stock market is small, natural resource 
(oil and mining company) oriented, and speculative. Bond issues 
have been virtually non-existent in the erratically inflationary 
environment, and there is no secondary market. 
Short-term financial markets for large transactions have been much more 
active, (The only comprehensive empirical study of the Philippine money market 
is Tan, 1981, chapter 7.) Philippine bankers, financiers, and big 
businessmen are very sophisticated. The gap between ceiling and 
market-equilibrium rates bas been sufficiently large that consider-
able, at times unconventional, financial innovation has taken place 
in efforts to avoid or evade the official ceilings (Khatkhate and 
Villanueva, 1979), It is impossible to obtain accurate, compre-
hensive data on effective interest rates. A probably reasonable 
generalization is that, particularly in periods of monetary 
tightness, virtually all private financial institution loans, 
except those eligible for preferential rediscount or to related 
business interests, have been at effective interest rates above 
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the ceiling. And large holders of financial assets have received 
yields substantially in excess of the maximums on deposits (See 
Tan, 1979, p. 49). 
Evolution of the money market has been in large part in 
response to interest rate ceilings and Central Bank regulations. 
A liquidity tightness in the mid-1960s led to the emergence of a 
commercial paper market (though not called that) with higher in­
terest rates than on deposits. To compete, banks began issuing 
bankers acceptances, trust certificates, repurchase agreements, 
and other deposit substitute instruments. Deposit substitutes 
flourished; with effective interest rates up to 30 percent de­
pending on market tightness, they amounted to some four-fifths 
of time and savings deposits by 1974-75 (IMF-World Bank Mission 
Report, 1979, p. 26 and Table 32, p. 61). It should be n0ted 
that commercial bank reliance on money market instruments as a 
source of funds vitiates the significance of M (as traditionally2 
defined) as a measure of financial development. 
III. Dynamic, Unstable Growth of the Private Domestic'Banking System 
Despite a long history, the commercial banking system has 
grown rapidly, albeit turbulently, only since the mid 1950s. 
Postwar development to 1980 can be divided at 1965, when new entry 
was discouraged. The number of banks quadrupled between 1950 and 
1965. 
Over the period there were several bank runs, which were 
relatively well contained by the Central Bank. Between 1968 and 
1977 three banks failed, but all later reopened under new names 
and management; various others have been in trouble from time to 
time, two or three almost perenially. In response to the increase 
in capital requirements to P.100 million in 1973, in 1974-76 some 
thirteen banks merged (into six) and eight took in foreign partners. 
ln 1975-78 three other banks changed ownership and their names were 
altered. In 1980 there were several further changes in ownership, and 
in 1981 additional mergers as the new era dawned-in part in response to 
new opportunities for large-scale (universal) banking, in part in response 
to the banking crisis of spring 1981. This history is briefly summarized 
in Table 4, which lists all the banks of the postwar period and ranks them 
by size of assets as of 1980. 
The 1946-65 period can be characterized as follows. Entry into 
commercial banking was easy and encouraged. Minimum capital requirements 
were low; the monetary authorities in effect subsidized the banks through 
government deposits, later withdrawn, and cheap central bank credit. The 
economy was going through import-substituting industrialization. Wealthy 
families began to move into industrial activities, and they recognised the 
benefits of controlling a bank. In other instances, a banking family moved 
into industry. Almost all bank owners are involved in one of the 
industrial groups. This is not surprising. It took some capital 
to start a bank; perhaps equally important were built-in depositor and 
lending relationships. As a consequence in 1950-55 five new banks were 
established, in 1955-60, four, and in 1961-65, some eighteen. 
By the mid-1960s the monetary authorities were concerned about the 
small size of banks, mismanageJ'lent, and the possibility (and actuality) of 
banks runs and financial crisis--concems continuing to this day. They 
essentially prohibited new bank entry, raised minimum capital requirements 
from P.8 million to P.20 million in 1965 and then to P.100 million in the 
1973 reforms, and from 1973 have encouraged bank mergers and the inflow 
of foreign equity capital. 
Despite the scandals and difficulties, Philippine banking history 
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between 1965 andl980 is less turbulent than that of Japan in the 1920s. 
Japan faced essentially the same problems, and also restricted entry, raised 
capital requirements, and forced mergers. The Philippines has not had a 
banking crisis as severe as Japan's in 1927. It is unclear in the 1965-80 
period whether the net flow of central bank credit was to or fran the private 
comnercial banks. It is clear central bank credit was increasingly distributed 
differentially--not just to weak banks in periodical or perennial trouble, 
but also to favored stronger banks. 
The 1970s was a period of shake-out and consolidation, much like 
Japan in the late 1920s and early 1930s. This process continues in the 
early 1980s. Of the 33 private commercial banks operating in 1973, 13 
merged between 1974 and 1976, mainly in response to the five-fold increase 
in minimum capital requirements. Two involved large banks, BPI and PCIB, 
absorbing small banks. In two instances• Filmanbank (now Pilipinas) and 
Associated Citizens, merger did not bring substantially improved performance. 
While a number of hanks have been in sufficient difficulty to require 
emergency loans from the Central Bank, only three have been closed by the 
Central Bank: the Overseas Bank of Manila in August 1968, the Continental 
Bank in June 1974, and the General Bank and Trust Company (Genbank) in 
March 1977. All three subsequently reopened, albeit under new names 
and owners. These cases provide insights into the instability of the system. 
While not among the top banks in size, none was among the smallest. Lack 
of capital per se did not cause failure. The-common pattern was one of 
bank owners making short-term loans to finance fixed (long-term) investments 
in affiliated companies, as well as unsecured loans to themselves. In some 
cases there were other financial irregularities but it is not clear they 
were the main cause of failure. In each instance there was a heavy run on 
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the bank when it became known some of the affiliated companies were in 
difficulty. 
The failure of Continental in 1974 was particularly dangerous 
because it precipitated a run on the entire system. Continental Bank 
was borrowing deposit substitutes heavily in the money mark.et• and lending 
long-term through its affiliate Continental Finance to other business 
affiliates and to finance real estate projects. When the President 
-was arrested and charged with alleged misappropri11tion of deposits 
and other financial irregularities• an innediate run on Continental Bank 
ensued and the Central Bank closed it. Concerns about the Continental 
failure spread to other banks; deposits started moving to the four foreign 
bank branches. The Central Bank averted a crisis by making emergency loans 
and assuring the financial comnunity it 'iiould cover all._ problems of liquidity~ __________ 
drain. 
~ank Typologies 
The banks can be classified by distinctive economic, 
sociological, political, institutional features. 
Table 5 groups them by management style and type of owner-
ship. The foreign bank branches are generally regarded as the most 
professionally, and best, managed. They, especially Citibank, have been 
a training ground for young Filipinos who have subsequently moved into 
domestic bank manageoent. Some family-managed banks are well managed, so 
inclusion in any particular category is not direct evidence on bank management. 
Classification by ownership type is common in the Philippines. The 
main distinction is between banks controlled by indigenous Filipinos and 
by Filipino-Chinese. Almost all the joint-venture banks are in fact controlled 
~omestically; foreign ownership is limited to 40 percent. Although Chinese 
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ownership is involved in two of the joint-venture banks (RCBC and Security) 
neither is classified as typically Chinese. 
Since there are considerable differences in the degree to which Chinese 
indirlduals.and families-have been integrated into the mainstream of Philippine 
life and culture, classification as Chinese is somewhat arbitrary. The stereotype 
is a ba~k started and owned by Chinese, receiving lUOSt of its deposits from Chinese, 
lending mainly to Chinese individuals and their companies. conservative 
in both assets and liability management and tmwilling to use much Central 
Bank credit. Within the Chinese business community a good word-of-mouth 
reputation for creditworthiness is essential. It is not possible to provide 
quantitative evidence regarding the sterotype; it certainly does not apply equally 
to all the banks under Chinese-Filipino ownership. 
The 1973 reforms made it possible for foreign banks to invest in 
domestic banks for the first time since 1947. Foreign investment was 
limited to a maximum of 40 percent, of which only 30 percent could be held 
in voting shares by one foreign owner. The liberalization was designed 
to attract foreign equity and loans while retaining domestic control. Eight 
banks took foreign partners (Table 4), for varied motives (Lava, 1976, pp. 
35-9). The record of these alliances is mixed. In six cases the major 
foreign bank subsequently pulled out, usually by selling to the domestic 
owners. Foreign involvement appears to be extensive only in Citytrust, 
infused by Citibank with able staff and good banking practises. While small. 
Citytrust is regarded as one of the best managed banks. 
Another classification is in terms of closeness to the present government. 
The phrases "political banks" or "quasi-governmental banks" are used but 
their meaning is not entirely clear, and it is not possible to detemine 
the precise operational significance of this classification. Those in control 
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of these banks are typically members of the "new elite" of groups. Data 
on relationships and degree of closeness are not readily available; 
certainly it varies by bank. The main criterion is that each is under 
the effective control of persons close to the present government. In 
most instances control passed to members of the "new elite" during the 
1970s. Republic Planters and UCPB are special cases of private ownership 
with special monopoly powers. Each is involved heavily in the finance 
of a traditional export crop--sugar and coconut respectively--and each, 
rather than the Treasury, receives as deposits the export levies on these 
crops (Tan et al, 1981, pp. 40-41). 
The Structure of the Comercial Banking Industry 
One striking feature of the Philippine banking system is the widely 
differential performances of banks--in growth, in profitability, in 
changes in relative position. Data are presented in Table 6. 
The concentration ratio in terms of the asset share of the top five 
private domestic commercial banks has been remarkably constant, around 
35 percent since the mid-1960s. However, this is not a good measure of 
market power because it excludes PNB, which is larger than the five private 
banks combined, and the four foreign banks. PNB, the five largest private 
domestic banks, and the two largest foreign bank branches (Citibank and 
Bank of America) together had 56 percent of total commercial bank assets 
in 1980. 
More important, market shares and relative rankings have changed 
dramatically over time. Only one (BPI) of the top five banks in assets 
in 1965 was in the top five in 1980, and only four of the top ten. China 
Bank declined significantly, from first to tenth. Four increased their 
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relative position sharply, from the bottom third to top positions including 
Allied (the successor of Genbank) from twenty-fourth to first and Metrobank 
from twenty-first to third. Republic Planters declined sharply over most 
of the period, but rebounded under its new "quasi-governmental" status in 
the late 1970s. 
The coefficient of rank correlation between bank size and profitability 
(as of 1979) is 0.67, not particularly high. Of the six banks in the top 
quartile in profitability, two are also in the top quartile in both asset 
and deposit growth-UCPB and Metrobank. UCPB is a special case since 
it receives low-cost deposits from the copra levies. 
Metrobank has expanded its branches aggressively I evidently with considerable 
success. Neither relied particularly heavily on Central Bank rediscount 
or swap facilities. Interestingly, the four top-rankers in profitability 
had below average growth both of assets and deposits. Their performance 
may well be explained by a combination of careful management policy and 
limited growth possibilities in their traditional market areas. 
In several instances the Central Bank has successfully restored 
troubled banks to reasonably good operations without closing them by 
changing management and providing bridging credit. However, a few banks 
remained chronically weak. The Central Bank has preferred to keep them 
afloat rather than forcing closure and thereby possibly causing a bank 
panic. Filmanbank, one of the weaker, was finally taken over by PNB, 
which provided it with an infusion of capital, management, and a Central 
Bank emergency loan. Associated Citizens has also been regarded as weak, 
due to poor profit performance and ongoing managerial problems between 
its two ownership groups. 
Four banks grew particularly rapidly from 1965 to 1980: Allied, 
Metrobank, UCPB, and RCBC. Four banks grew particularly rapidly between 
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1974 and 1980: again Allied and UCPB • and also Republic Planten (RPB) 
and Traders Royal. Neither merger nor foreign capital partners were of lasting 
importance. Beyond that few generalizations are possible. Ketrobank., 
Chinese-Filipino owned• has quietly but steadily grc,,,m over the years, 
has expanded branches rapidly• bas been very profitable. and has not been 
closely involved with the govemment. RCBC• owned by the Yuchengco family• 
had its main growth spurt from 1965 to 1973• when an innovative management 
worked closely with the investment house Bancom. Conflict in 1973 between 
the bank owners and the Bancom group ended the connection• but RCBC has 
continued to do -well under professional management. 
The other four banks that have grown rapidly are all in the political 
bank category. As already noted• UCPB and Republic Planters 
benefit from special privileges. Traders Royal has combined exceptionally 
rapid deposit and asset growth, moving 
from among the smallest to eighth rank. Its profit record. poor overall, 
improved significantly between 1978 and 1980. Little is known about its sources 
of deposits or its clients. but it is not highly regarded by the financial 
community. 
The most remarkable success story in the late 1970s was Allied 
Bank. Allied has risen like the legendary phoenix from the ashes of Genbank, 
which was closed in March 1977. The Central Bank found in Lucio Tari 
(chairman) and Wllly Co (vice-chairman) new owners able and willing to 
infuse large amounts of capital• and to assemble a vigorous management 
team headed by an experienced banker, Romeo Co. Apparently Tan• of 
Fortune Tobacco, is the dominant owner. Not earlier identified as one of 
the 48 major groups, Tan has risen to considerable prominence since 1977. 
'nle Central Bank, with P 310 million in advances to Genbank, continued 
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a atrong package of support. Allied has grown remarkably rapidly. In just 
two and a half years it became the largest private domestic COD1Dercial bank. 
Allied has been aggressive in opening branches and seeking new 
business clients for loans, in part by highly competitive lending terms. It 
concentrates particularly on medium-size businesses--not the SEC-Business 
Day top 300, but the next 700. It has been highly responsive to the 
incentives built into governmental programs to provide funds for 
priority uses. But this is not the full story. Considerable interest 
has focussed on how Allied has been able to raise substantial funds so 
quickly. One answer is that it has had great access to Central Bank 
(See Table 7 later.) 
credit./ At the end of 1978 Allied had outstanding P.889 million 1n loans 
and advances from the Central Bank, nearly twice that of the second 
largest borrower. This was equivalent to 24 percent of Allied's total 
assets, and 321 percent of its net worth. Moreover, it had P.665 million 
in foreign currency swaps, equivalent to 18 percent of its total assets, 
36 percent of its total deposits, and 240 percent of its net worth. Central 
Bank support was undoubtedly essential in 1977 to ensure Allied's solid 
beginning. The support received in 1978 and 1979 went far beyond those 
requirements, and was also substantially above average rediscount 
priviledges relative to paid-in capital and priority program loans. 
How do the profitability and growth indicators of differential 
bank performance compare with the managerial, ownership, and political 
criteria discussed earlier? Three of the six banks identified as professionally 
managed are in the top six in profitability, but two are below average. 
Of the three banks in the top quartile in profitability, growth of assets, 
and deposits-UCPB, Metrobank 1 and FEBTC--one is in each management category. 
At the other extreme four of the six least profitable banks were in the 
owner-managed category. No clear association between management style and 
performance emerges. 
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For the eight political banks, the record is mixed but on average 
favorable. Half are in the top half ranked by profitability. But 
five are in the top aix in assets growth• and four in the top •ix (and 
aix in the top eight) in deposits growth. UCPB and Allied have done 
extremely well by all criteria. Only PCIB ranks in the bottom quartile 
in profitability and growth. 
Thus• there are no single• or simple• explanations for the large 
differences in growth rates and profit rates among banks. Size is no 
answer; some small banks do very well. some large banks do poorly. Good 
aggressive, innovative management-whether professional or family--obviously 
has been important; but it is difficult to obtain independent measures of 
management capabilities. Membership in the "new elite" has benefitted some banks. 
Success has been achieved by several routes. 
IV. Cotrlllercial Bank Assets and Liabilities 
As discussed above, commercial banking has grown rapidly but there have been 
wide differences in the performancesof individual banks. In this section we look more 
closely at bank.management of their liabilities and assets. The focus is the decade 
of the 1970s• and the way banks have responded to external opporttmities 
(such as Central Bank credit or swaps) and constraints (such as interest 
rate ceilings). Detailed portfolio data by bank are not available. 
Bank Liabilities Management 
The essence of commercial banking is the acquisition of deposits 
and deposit-substitutes from private sources, and the lending or investing 
·- of ·"""toose funds. · Financial intermediation occurs most effectively through __ 
leverage. 
In 1980• the average net worth of banks was 8 .5 percent of 
total assets. On average about 94 percent of total liabilities (excluding 
net worth) have been either de~osits or borrowed funds. Borrowings include 
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Central Bank rediscounts and advances as well as private funds. With 
occasional specific exceptions, deposits by the government in the private 
commercial banks have been negligible in the 1970s. Foreign currency •waps 
also enter the deposit base. 
Reflecting the growth and relative decline of deposit substitutes, 
the share of deposits in total liabilities has ranged widely over time for 
the system and for some banks. The average ratio for all banks in 1980 
was 63 percent, indicating considerable reliance on borrowed funds. Some 
banks have developed strong deposit bases-BPI especially, but also Solidbank, 
Prudential, Metrobank, and (based on the copra levy) UCPB. The average 
varies substantially by bank, with no clearly discernible explanation except 
that banks regarded as weak have a higher proportion of demand deposits. 
A basic liabilities management choice is the extent a bank relies 
on borrowed funds, which are a quick, easy way to growth. However• borrowed 
funds have been substantially more costly than deposits because their market 
is competitive, while the ceiling on deposit interest rates 
constituted a subsidy by depositors to bank stockholders. Only when the 
marginal effective lending rate (adjusted for risk) is higher than the 
deposit substitute rate is it profitable for banks to borrow. Moreover, deposit 
substitutes may be more volatile, with shorter effective maturity~ which makes 
them a riskier source of funds. The most profitable banks are divided almost 
equally between those relying substantially more or substantially less than 
average on borrowed funds; one strategy has not clearly dominated the other. 
The Central Bank's stated rule has been to allow discount of 
eligible paper up to 50 percent of paid-in capital, plus paper eligible 
under Central Bank priority allocations (exports, small business, agriculture, 
etc.). Because the spread between the rediscount rate and the bank effective 
lending rate has been substantial, one would expect, in the absence of informal 
rules, all banks would continuously borrow almost to their limit. In practice 
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that has not been the case; Table 7 provides the available data _for year-end 
1978, 1979, and 1980. 
First, central bank credit. During 1978-80 provision of Central Bank 
credit was somewhat greater than the net worth of the banking system 
(Table 7). This lending has been more than double the regular ceiling; 
special rediscounting for priority or other purposes was of greater 
importance than general rediscounting. What is startling is that seven 
banks in at least one of these three years had borrowings more than double 
their net worth, and three for all three years. Republic Planters is a 
special case because it could rediscount its sugar bills, its main business. 
A similar pattern of great variance appears in swap arrangements. 
For the 1978-80 period swaps were slightly more important than Central Bank 
loans and advances; they financed about 12 percent of bank total assets. 
Seven banks had access to swap facilities in exce·ss of their net worth 
in 1978, and fourteen in 1980. Not all banks with large Central Bank 
borrowings had large swap arrangements. Adding swaps and loans, reliance 
on central Bank-related credit ranged from 46 percent of assets to 2 
percent in 1978, and from 90 percent to 8 percent in 1980. 
Part of the explanation for the disparities lies in the policy 
decisions and behavior of individual banks. Some banks prefer not to be 
involved with the Central Bank any nore than necessary. And some banks 
may not meet Central Bank standards. Nonetheless, the extraordinarily 
large amounts of Central Bank credit going to a few banks are difficult 
to justify by economic criteria. Interviews indicate a widespread perception 
that banks have not had equal access to Central Bank support; however as 
a group the political banks have not benefitted disproportionately. 
Nonetheless, case-by-case approval of even relatively small swap contracts 
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has lent itself to misuse, and opportunities for personal gain by ad­
ministrators. One member of the financial community commented on the 
personal influences on Central Bank credit allocation decisions: "Each 
bank tries to have a friend in court to help out with specific projects 
or needs; having the right connection makes a lot of difference." 
Nonetheless, it is difficult to generalize; each bank's situation must 
be considered separately; the quantitative data are merely guideposts to 
what is actually going on. For example, in 1978 RCBC was the largest user 
of swap facilities; presumably this is the continuation of a atrategy and 
pattern initiated in the late 1960s. While RCBC's large Central Bank loans 
were because of a lending policy which generaed preferential paper for 
rediscount~ it was unusually well trained. By 1980 PCIB was being 
particularly well treated, while Allied had become less of an outlier. 
There is no general pattern whereby banks with foreign partners are larger 
than average users of swap facilities. The two weakest banks did not 
receive a great deal of Central Bank support between 1978-80. 
Bank Asset Portfolio Management 
Interest rate ceilings have distorted incentives and biased lending: 
toward the most creditworthy--large firms, those with excellent collateral­
-and away from the more risky; toward large transactions and against small 
where administrative costs are relatively higher; toward known, established 
borrowers and against those wher~ costs of evaluation are greater; and toward 
the short-term. The group ownership pattern provides another set of 
distortions, more difficult to determine. 
Because so few data are available on bank asset portfolios and 
credit allocation, much less the explicit or implicit rules governing 
-31-
bank behavior, it is possible to evaluate the efficiency of the allocation 
process, only in general terms. (For a more detailed discussion, see IMF-­
World Bank, 1979.) Separate data are not available for the private dom­
estic banks, but probably the general patterns would not differ greatly 
from that shown in Table 8 for all commercial banks. The Table's interest 
rate data are difficult to interpret: effective interest rates are higher; 
some lower-rate loans may be under Central Bank priority lending programs, 
othersmay be at preferential terms to owners and related interests. 
The top tier of borrowers are the largest 300 industrial corporations. 
Almost all are affiliated with a family group, or are foreign-owned or 
government corporations. The second and third tiers comprise mainly the next 700. 
Below these are the small units which in fact produce nine-tenths of 
Philippine GNP. For most banks the main choice is the degree to which 
they concentrate lending on the first tier, relatively to the second 
and third tiers. The first tier market is highly competitive, with net spreads as 
low as 0.5 percentage points, First tier firms obtain a substantial share 
of commercial banks loans, and probably most of the long-term credit.• 
Major foreign banks lend primarily in this market. 
The second and third tiers are much more lenders markets. Borrowers 
are more concerned about access to and availability of funds than marginal 
cost. Collateral is important. So too are long, well-established ties. 
Net spreads to banks are up to 3 percentage points. The delineation between 
second and third tiers is somewhat arbitrary as firms are spread over a 
multi~dimensional continuum. One criterion is that the second tier includes 
firms able and willing to borrow in the P.5-20 million range, while third­
tier finns typically need loans under P.5 million. 
Philippine bankers respond to interest rate ceilings in the same 
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way they have in postwar Japan or other countries where ceilings prevail. 
CFor an analysis of some adjustment teclmiques in Japan see Patrick, 1966.) 
Much of the adjustment is through assets portfolio management. They seek 
both to minimize costs and to increase effective yields. Cost miniai&ation 
is achieved by lending in large amounts (reducing transactions costs), to 
well-known companies (reducing information costs), and under the least 
risky conditions (top-tier companies or excellent collateral). Effective 
interest rates are raised in various ways. Service fees and commissions 
are charged; these, together with interest, are deducted in advance. Such 
fees are supposedly limited to 2 percentage points; in fact they can be 
considerably higher. Other business, such as letters of credit and foreign 
exchange transactions, is important. Import and export financing are 
particularly attractive, in part because exchange between pesos and 
foreign currency can be at bank-determined spreads. Requiring compensating 
balances is illegal, but as one financial specialist put it, "it is not 
illegal for the companies to offer to hold deposit balances and for the 
banks to accept". Banks also increase effective yields by establishing 
finance companies, lending companies, and similar non-bank financial 
institution subsidiaries. The banks lend to them at rates within the 
ceiling; they in turn finance activities, or engage in direct investment, 
at higher yields. 
Thus, data are not available on effective lending rates. Katigbak 
(October 29, 1979) suggests a cost of borrowing by clients as 18-24 percent, 
depending on the degree of compensating business provided by the client. 
Money market rates would be a reasonable proxy, but evidence on actual 
rates (substantially above formal ceiling rates) is fragmentary. Regulation 
has made the money market less visible, less efficient, but nonetheless 
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quite competitive. The be1t •tudy of the money market appear• in Tan et 
al. (1981). They obtained detailed data on money market tranaactions, 
but note their interest rate data are probably below actual rates. (Other 
studies are Tan, 1979, and Roxas, 1976.) 
The family (group) ownership of banks is certainly an additional 
factor in determining the portfolio composition of banks. It has been 
an accepted practice to lend to one's own group, just as zaibatsu banks 
did in prewar Japan and keiretsu banks have done in postwar Japan. Economic 
theory does not provide an unambiguous answer as to whether the financing 
of groups by their affiliated banks results in more or less efficient credit 
allocation than a system based on more arms-length transactions; it i& an 
empirical issue. While lending to one's own businesses may well lead 
to greater de facto term transformation and risk-taking, it probably 
also impairs bank safety, as all the bank failures demonstrate. Efficiency 
is not the only criterion; such a system tends to maintain and enhance 
the concentration of wealth in a small number of families. 
How extensive is lending to directors, officers, stockholders, 
and related interests (DOSRI), which is the main channel to affiliated 
(group) activities? Only the owner-managers of the banks really know. 
The Central Bank has set ceilings on DOSRI loans to an amount not exceeding 
their respective outstanding deposits and book value of their share of paid-in 
capital of the bank. Central Bank data indicate that as of December 31, 197S 
DOSRI loans comprised 8.1 percent of commercial bank loan portfolios, 4.6 
percent for savings banks. 10.4 percent for investment houses, and 1.7 
percent for financing companies. The monetary authorities and private 
bankers agree Central Bank data on DORSI greatly understate the actual 
credit relationships. One rule of thumb has been that all unsecured loans, 
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about one-third of the total, are DOSRI. 
One issue is whether there have been political pressure on banks 
to make loans for particular projects or to particular companies or 
individuals. The general concensus of those interviewed is that such 
political pressures on most banks have been relatively modest, certainly 
far less than during the politically decentralized, convoluted period 
of the late 1960s and early 1970s when many politicians were able to 
force banks into loans that at times were little more than payments to 
the politicians. During Martial Law there were fewer politicians, 
political power was more centralized, and the economic environment less 
politicized. Equally important, politically-generated needs 
have been met through the various Government financial institutions and to 
some degree the political banks. Those interviewed pointed out that, 
unlike the earlier period, during the 1970s real investment was financed­
-hotels, roads, sugar mills, cement factories, housing--and that demand 
does eventually catch up with capacity. Perhaps the main issue is the degree 
to which politically-motivated loans are accepted or at least tolerated 
as an inherent fixed cost of the scx:b-political-economic system, and to 
what degree they are variables subject to policy change. 
Financing Development 
There is widespread agreement that the pattern of credit allocation has 
not been optimal for Philippine economic development. Part is due to the 
development strategy itself, which pushed import-substitution too far at 
the expense of exports and which did not create as vigorously competitive 
an industrial structure in domestic markets as has occurred in Japan, 
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Part lies in government policiea which have diatorted incentives 
in finance-the inability to control inflationary aurge•• the intereat rate 
ceilings. And part lies in the •tructure of the financial syatem itaelf • 
though probably less than criticisms would suggest. The COT11111erical banks• 
given their structure and the environment in which they operate. have not 
aurprisingly provided financial services mainly to urban areas• and lent 
_short-term to large. uaually aafe and often affiliated• industrial and 
commercial enterprises. In general. the financial system givespreference 
to the financing of co111Derce • especially imports and exports• and to large 
firms. 
In contrast, it is generally agreed the financial system as a whole• 
and certainly its private component. has provided inadequate credit, to 
small-scale farmers (especially for non-export crops) and to amall businesses. 
Moreover, it is seen as not carrying out sufficient tem transformation (pro­
viding sufficient medium and long-term credit). The monetary authorities 
have sought to redress these imbalances. Priority sectors have been identified 
and low cost credit has been provided. The Central Bank provides commercial 
banks preferential rediscounts for selected priority purposes--exports. 
certain types of agricultural loans. and the like-and also attempts 
to redirect their loan portfolios through various regulations. The 
government financial institutions provide two-fifths of total credit 
(Table 2). 'Ibey obtain resources from social security revenues and other 
governmental sources; from international lending institutions such as the 
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank and foreign capital markets; 
and from the Central Bank. 
The financing of agriculture is important, but detailed consideration 
(see Teranishi> this volume). 
is beyond the scope of this study/ Economic and financial dualism are 
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pronounced; large landowners• corporate or family• produce commercial export 
crops• often on plantations• and raise funds through the modem financial 
system. Small farmers, typically rice-growers, rely much more on traditional 
sources of agrarian credit (moneylenders, friends and relatives) or government­
subsidized credit programs (which barely reach the very small, especially 
landless, producers). A recent study of rural finance 
by the Presidential Comnittee on Agriculture Credit (1981) reports 
the average interest rate in the informal (traditional) market was 55.5 
percent, and on loans from all sources (i.e. including formal institutions) 
was 45.0 percent. 
Commercial banks are required to lend one-quarter of their 
incremental loanable funds over their May 1975 base for agricultural purposes. 
However, Central Bank certificates of indebtedness can be held to meet 
this requirement in part; they are preferred since they are riskless, have 
low transactions costs, their yield is determined by market auction, and 
they simultaneously can be used to meet deposit reserve requirements. Central 
Bank programs have not been particularly successful in significantly increasing 
private domestic com:nercial bank lending to small farmers. As Table 8 indicates, 
agricultural loans have remained substantially below target. 
The situation for small business is similar, though much less well 
studied. In periods of credit stringency as in 1979, even though total 
credit increased, the amounts to the smallest enterprises declined absolutely,c 
while that to the large firms increased substantially (Table 9 ). 
The basic cause of commercial bank aversion to lending to agriculture 
and to small business is that it has not been profitable. Lending has been 
squeezed between high transactions costs and the interest rate ceilings. 
Studies by Saito and Villanueva (1978, nos. 49 and 53) for various types 
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of financial institutions •ugge1t transactions coat• (adminiatr•tive plua 
default loss risk) for loans to nall-acale agriculture on the order of 
5.5-7.3 percent, to small-scale enterprises 5.5-6. 7 percent. and to large enterprises 
1.8-2.5 percent (2.1 percent for c011111ercial banks). 
A major policy concern has been the shortage of medium and long-term 
credit to finance fixed investment. The data understate actual maturities 
as most short-term loans are renewed (rolled over). Rollover is advantageous 
to banks since they can regularly add service fees to raise effective yields. 
•Data on credit granted by term are weak. Loans outstanding by financial 
institution as of 1977 are presented in Table 10. 
The share of intermediate and long-term loans is quite large~ 
substantially higher than for either prewar or postwar Japan. However 
. demand is not satisfied for any term. Government financial institutions, 
particularly DBP, made 72 percent of the long-term mid 24 percent. of the 
medium-term loans. Commercial banks, which includes PNB, provided just 
one-fifth of the term credit. A large and increasing proportion of new 
long-tei'm credit--rising from 42 percent in 1975 to 72 percent in 1978--came 
from foreign sources. 
Medium-long term financing has not been economically attractive 
to lenders, and perhaps not to potential borrovers either. There have 
been three main causes: the high and erratic rates of inf lat ion during the 
1970s, especially in 1979-80: the interest rate ceiling system: and low 
interest rates on many foreign loans. 
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In our view the basic culprit bas been the interest rate ceiling 
system. It has prevented the emergence of a normal term structure of 
interest rates; the available evidence suggests the persistence of an 
inverse term structure of interest rates, implausible for other than 
relatively short periods of time in free financial markets. An infonnal 
private market in term loans has developed parallel to the money mark.et, 
presumably at interest rates appropriately higher than effective short-term 
rates; however, no data are available on amounts or effective interest 
rates. 
The official data on longer-term interest rates reflect the fact that 
the cost of foreign borrowing, longer-term as well as short, has been 
significantly cheaper than domestic borrowing (IMF-World Bank Mission, 
1979, p. 34). The low rates (relative to domestic Philippine rates) on 
World Bank and similar official loans in many instances are passed on 
as a form of indirect subsidy. Only after all such possible opportunities 
are exploited does it make sense for the enterprise. almost always large­
scale, to turn to the domestic market. For efficiency in credit and capital 
allocation and for encouragement of the domestic market for term credit 
it would be preferable for the monetary authorities to charge domestic 
interest rates on foreign loans. It is more efficient to subsidize directly 
projects with high social benefit but low market profitability. 
Unfortunately, at times the government has established as priority 
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projects a number that have performed badly, through poor project selection 
(such as cellophane and hotela), major cost overruns where the causes are 
not completely clear (the Westinghouse nuclear electric power project, 
the Manila convention center, airplane purchases), or the creation of 
overcapacity (sugar mills, cement). It would be useful to have an analysis 
of the criteria the government uses to determine projects, the entrepreneurs 
to carry them out, the funding arrangements, the actual costs and expenditures 
involved, and the resultant social benefit. Data are not av.ailable. Perhaps 
it should be expected priorities are shaped by political as well as economic 
considerations. 
v. Dawn of a New Era? 
Only time will tell whether our delineation of 1980-81 as a major 
turning point in Philippine financial development is correct. The government 
has instituted major refonns in both the institutional framework of the financial 
system and its interest rate ceiling policy. The main purposes are to 
increase competition among all kinds of financial institutions and to increase 
the availability of long-term funds for investment. In addition, the financial 
system was subjected to a major crisis in spring 1981, triggered by the flight 
of a highly respected business leader who left large debts behind. 
In April 1980 the government passed a series of laws that enabled 
various financial institutions to engage in a wider range of functions, 
thereby reducing market segmentation. ( A good general description is 
"Unibanking" in Business Day, August 28, 1980, Section Ill• pp. 17-32.) 
Functional differences among various types of thrift institutions were eliminated, 
and they were allowed to compete directly with coounercial banks for domestic 
demand deposits; in effect they have become deposit-creating (i.e., commercial) 
banks. Other financial institutions are also allowed to convert to commercial 
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the 
bank status on meeting/ P.100 million net worth requirement. Mergers 
among various types of financial institutions are encouraged. At the 
same time minimWll capital requirements have been increased, reduci~g 
entry opportunities by small institutions. 
The most visible, and most controversial, change has been the 
authorization of expanded banking activities by very large commercial 
banks (with net worth of P. 500 million). This is termed unibanking in 
the Philippines, based on the German model of universal banking. 
The most important new function is that unibanks may engage in invest­
ment banking, both underwriting of new security issues and direct 
equity participation in industrial enterprises. In addition they receive 
favorable tax treatment and other incentives, possibly including preferred 
access to Central Bank credit. Unibanking is discussed in the IMF Mission 
Report (1979) and Patrick and Moreno (1980). and in a broader context in 
Khatkhate and Riechel (1980). 
Potentially the most profound reform was to shift from a ceiling 
interest r·ate system to a market-determined system, effective July 1, 
1981, for time and savings deposits and term loans. At the same time the 
monetary authorities made clear they would not tolerate "excessive com-
petition" for deposits that hurt smaller banks and thrift institutions. 
It seems possible that price leadership or other forms of oligopolistic 
behavior will occur. It is premature to judge whether a market-determined 
financial system with flexible interest rates will prevail. Interest rate ceilings 
on loans with a maturity less than two years were not removed, on the 
grounds this would provide an upper limit to interest-rate competition for 
deposits. The monetary authorities have indicated they plan to move gradually 
to a completely market-determined system. That would presumably result in 
a more efficient allocation of credit and greater rewards to savers. 
-41-
VI. Conclusions 
In the 1955-80 period the Philippines has undergone financial develop­
ment similar in kind though not degree to that in Japan from the 1870s to 
the 1930s. Like Japan it created a dynamic system of commercial banks and 
a variety of specialized institutions for the collection of savings, fin­
ancing of agriculture, and provision of long-term credit. The facilitating 
role of the government has been important, both in the first phase when 
entry was easy and banks received government deposits, and subsequently 
when entry was restricted, merger encouraged, and minimum capital size 
raised. A further important, and in some respects disturbing, similarity 
was the recurrent instability of the two banking systems. 
By standard criteria Philippine commercial bank lending appears 
. reasonable; the ..average term is short, liquid asset ratios are relatively 
high, there is considerable diversification among sectors. But actual 
risks are probably substantially higher. Sectoral diversification masks 
what is substantially less diversification by group or DOSRI borrowers; 
moreover such borrowers tend to engage in risky, at times speculative, 
investment activities. Nor is fraud unknown. And the still­
underdeveloped state of the economy means increased risk as well as 
opportunity. 
Riskiness on the loan (asset) side is matched by the insecurity 
of depositors. While the core of deposits for the commercial banking system 
as a whole may be relatively stable (as the IMF-World Bank, 1979, alleges), 
that has certainly been far less true for individual banks, especially 
the weaker banks. Moreover, it does not take into account the important 
share of deposit substitutes in the liability structure of many banks; 
they are quite volatile, and too large to be covered by the relative modest 
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amounta of ·deposit insurance. Min the first aixty year• of Japanue 
banking history, in the Philippines the monetary authoritiea have had to 
step in time and again to stop bank runs or contai• their apread. 
Perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from the Japanese 
experience of financial development bas to do with interest rate policy. 
The lesson is twofold. First, from the 1870s to the eve of World War II, 
a flexible, free, market-determined interest rate aystem contributed 
significantly to the rapid growth and relatively high level of financial 
intermediation, the increasing role of the modern financial aector and the 
decline in financial dualism, the allocation of credit among various 
types of users (while also biased toward large firms, apparently less 
so than in the Philippines), and the healthy growth of a strong capital 
market, including bonds and term loans. Second, the imposition of a 
controlled interest system with credit rationing, instituted during World 
War II and maintained in the postwar period, has probably had few advantages 
and has not had major deleterious effects only because the rate of private 
saving became so high, alternative saving (investment) opportunities were 
limited for the increasingly urban population, business investment demand 
was high• and econmic growth was so rapid. 
The adverse impacts of the controlled interest rate system included 
redistributing income from the average Japanese (who saved in deposit form 
at low real interest rates) to the already wealthier stockholders and 
employees of the large firms receiving credit at low interest rates; and 
that the capital market 1 especially the bond market, did not develop and 
contribute significantly to the financing of long-term investment. It is 
noteworthy that relative to GNP per capita. financial development in Japan's 
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repressed poatwar financial 1y1tem was aubstantially below th.at of 
Japan's market-oriented prewar ayatem {Patrick, 1982). 
The Philippiee monetary authorities have known this lesson of 
the benefits of a market-oriented interest rate system since the early 
1970s, but began implementing it only in 1981. 
One of the most 1triking 1imilarities between contemporary Philippines 
and prewar Japan is the emergence of family-owned financial-industrial­
commercial groups of affiliated companies under central control (family-based 
groups, or zaibatsu). Because there are far fewer banks in the Philippines, 
the concentration of bank ownership to major wealth units seems substantially 
greater than in prewar Japan. 
The relative economic effectiveness in the economic development 
process of the (family) group form of industrialization cannot be 
determined a priori. As Japan's experience as well as other cases 
suggest• there are both economic benefits and costs. ( For general discussions 
see Leff 1976 and 1979.) On the benefit side, the group may be able and 
willing to innovate, to search out foreign teclmology (frequently through 
joint ventures), to pool and otherwise take risk; to reduce risk and increase 
profits by internalizing to the group economies external to the individual 
firm; to economize on scarce entrepreneural, managerial, marketing, and 
technical skills; and to offset imperfections in financial markets. On 
the·cost side the group may exploit market power not only of individual 
firms in oligopolistic markets but of its entire operations; divert scarce 
capital and other resources to its own> less efficient, activities; reduce 
the general competitive environment; and so forth. 
The major criticisms of the group form are not simply in terms of standard 
economic criteria. The group perpetuates and enhances the concentration 
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of income, wealth, and economic power. That economic power apills over 
into political power. They do not have to take as given the rules of the 
economic game as determined by government. 
The "lessons" from the prewar Japanese experience of the zaibatsu 
form of industrial and financial organization are complex, mixed, and 
not yet fully evaluated by economic, political, or aocial criteria. It 
is our guess that on pure economic efficiency grounds the zaibatsu (and the 
uew zaibatsu of the 1930s, in some respects analagous to the Philippine 
new elite of the l970s) were a net contributor to Japan's·economic development 
prior to World War II. Despite some static misallocation of resources 
through exploitation of oligopoly market power, as entrepreneurs they may 
have imported technology and allocated resources reasonably well in a 
dynamic context. However, the political and social costs of the zaibatsu 
probably outweighed their efficiency benefits. There are few apologists for 
the zaibatsu. 
This group form of industrial organization seem a significant 
characteristic in many late comer developing countries with a capitalist 
system of private ownership of property. This phenomenon suggests a 
number of important theoretical and empirical issues: to what extent is 
the group form of industrial organization inevitable? To what extent 
will family-controlled groups evolve into management-controlled 
organizations? To what extent can the nature, growth, and function of 
groups be controlled by government policy? What are the interrelationships 
between economic and political power? 
We cannot pretend to answer these questions in the Philippine context. 
-45-
No economic analysis has been done of the role of family groups; indeed 
the data are not available. However, the highly respected economist 
technocrat and current Prime Minister Cesar Virata has said: "Each of 
these family groups has its own conglomerate •.• theSe types of development 
have not produced an efficient industrial system. We cannot allow small 
cement plants to proliferate> for example> just because each family would 
like to have one" (Business Week, May 17• 1982). Inefficiently small­
sized plants have been more likely under the Philippines' import-protection 
policies; in prewar Japan's more open trade context the zaibatsu behaved 
differently. Interestingly, several of the "new elite" groups that 
flourished the most in the 1970s were in the greatest trouble in the 
1981 crisis; indeed> government financial institutions had to assume 
at least temporary control of the ~erdes Group's Interbank and Commercial 
Bank (the 1981 re-opened successor to the Overseas Bank), and the 
Silverio Group's Philipinas Bank. 
Inevitably the study of the commercial banking system becomes, implicitly 
at least, in part a discourse upon economic power in bhe Philippines. 
Ongoing economic and political changes have created opportunities for 
entry into the elite despite the great importance of inheritance. 
Nonetheless, economic wealth and power remain highly concentrated. For general 
discussion see Mang ahas and Barros• 1979. The relationships between and 
among the groups are variegated, situational, and certainly complex; they 
involve elements of friendship, hatred, alliance, competition, and ad hoc 
arrangements. The Philippine rules of the game at the top are different 
from Japan or the United States, and certainly the game is played as toughly 
in the Philippines. There are major differences in "revealed" cultural norms 
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shown in the behavior of those in power. Practices regarded as un­
acceptable in the United States or Japan are apparently tolerated in the 
contemporary Philippines. The relationships among financial, commercial, 
and industrial power, and their imPlicat ions for development in the 
broadest sense. have vet to be understood fully--in the Philippines. 
in Japan. and indeed in any nation in the world. 
-.. ;­
Footnotes 
*The authors are respectively Professor of Economics, Yale University 
and Assistant Professor of Economics, University of the Philippines. We 
indebted to various leading members of the public and private financialare 
conmunity for their insights provided in interviews, and to Lerma Moreno 
and Ellen Rose Payongayong for research assistance. We have benefitted 
Philippinefrom discussions with Professor Edita Tan and her research on 
finance (see especially Tan 1979, and Tan et al, 1981). Patrick is 
mainly responsible for the interview data and the drafting of this essay, and Moreno 
'for the tabular data. Financial support for this study was provided by 
the International Development Center of Japan through its Comparative 
Analysis Project. 
1Recently the IMF and World Bank staff have prepared a series of 
studies including the Philippines in comparative analysis of financial 
markets and institutions in developing countries; see, for example, 
Khatkhate and Villanueva (1979) and Saito and Villanueva (1978, #49). 
2The specific dating is somewhat arbitrary. For a IIX>re detailed 
the 1970sdiscussion of the Japanese financial system from the 1880s to 
see Teranishi and Patrick a977 and 1978), and Patrick (1967, 1972, 1980, 
and 198 2). 
3For good studies of Philippine economic performance see Ranis et al. 
(1974); Bautista (1980); and Bautista and Power (1980); and the periodic 
publications ("Executive Briefing Pamphlets" and others) of the Center for 
Research and Connnunications, Manila. 
4Relatively few empirical studies are available; the Nicaragua case 
has been analyzed by Strachan (1976), Pakistan by White (1974), and Korea 
by Jones and Sakong (1980). Our study focuses on Philippine commercial 
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banks and hence the operations of domestic groups. Many groups, especially 
the largest, have substantial tie-ups with foreign firms, mainly based 
in the United States or Japan. For a description of Japanese involvement, 
as well as brief descriptions of most of the Filipino groups, see Tsuda 
(1978). 
5Emery (1970), IMF/World Bank Mission (1979), and Tan et al. (1981) 
provide good general descriptions of the financial system. For more 
detailed quantitative data see Hooley and Moreno (forthcoming), and the 
annual reports and other.publications of the Central Bank of the Philippines. 
An important analytical review of the literature is provided by Tan (1979). 
6see IMF-World Bank Mission Report (1979, p. 1), Table 2, and 
for 1970, Ranis et al (1974, p. 229, adjusted to exclude Central Bank 
assets). The comparable ratios for prewar Japan were 37 percent in 1885, 
64 percent in 1900, 110 percent in 1913, 133 percent in 1920, and 240 
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Source: World Bank, World Development Ref>?rt 1982, Annex. 
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Table 2. The Philippine Financial System: Institutions and Total Assets 
Number: 1980 Total Assets Percent of Percent Katio 
Total Assets to GNPHead Total
Offices Offices 1974 1980 1.974 1980 1974 1980 
--·-
Banking Institutions 1209 3419 54,142.8 193 ,599~ 2 72.3 79.9 54.2 71.8 
Commercial Banks 32 1501 42,424.8 144,428.0 56.7 59,6 42.5 53.5*Government 2 13,154.3 41,395.0 17.6 17.1 13.2 15.3Private domestic 26 23,133.0 84,275,1 30.9 34.8 23.1 31.2Private foreign branches 4 5,605.4 18,730.9 7.5 7.7 5.6 6.9 
Thrift Banks 144 671 1,666.9 10,547, 1 2.2 4.4 1.6 3.9Private development banks 43 B7i -296.3 1,618.3 0,4 "o:'f 0.3 D.6Savings and ITK'lrtgage banks 10 266 1,159.9 7,352.6 1.6 3.0 1.2 2.7Stock savings and loan associations 91 251 210.7 1,576.2 0.3 0.7 0.2 0.6 
Rural Banks 1030 1155 2,110.7 ~524,2 2.8 2.3 2.1 2.0 
*Specialized Banks 3 92 7,940.4 33,099.9 10.6 13.7 7.9 12.3*Development Bond of the Philippines 6,758,0 27,088.0 g:o 11.2 CT 10.0*Land Bank 1,182.4 6,056.0 1.6 2.5 1.2 2.2*Philippine Amanah Bank -
Nonbank Financial Institutions 1178 1475 20,714.2 48,604.5 27,7 20.1 20.7 18.0 
Investment houses 12 62 3,839.9 8,607.3 5,1 3.6 3.8 3.2Finance companies 342 531 2,306.7 11,902.1 3.1 4.9 2.3 4.4Investment companies 62 62 689.0 4,979.7 0.9 2.1 0.7 1.8Securities dealers/brokers 141 141 882.1 1,035.5 1.2 0.4 0,9 0.4Pawnshops 544 598 100.8 290.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1Fund managers 12 12 1,951.5 1,658.1 2,6 0.7 1.9 0.6Lending investors 57 61 24.9 50.2Nonstock savings and loan associations 72 72 71.2 299.4 0.1 0,1 0.1 0.1Mutual building and loan associations 7 7 24.7 18.7Private insurance companies 
3,468.0 4.6 3.4*Specialized Nonbank 4 4 7,355.4 19,763.0 9,8 8.2 7.3 7.3*GSIS (Gov't Service Insurance System) 4,144.5 9,245.5 5.5 3.8 4.T 3.4*SSS (Social Security System) 
2,388.9 8,22"0.7 3.2 3.4 2.4 3.0*ACA (Agricultural Credit Administration) 
451.5 0,6 0.5*NIDC (Nat'l Industrial Dev. Corp.) 
370.5 0.5 0.4 
Total 74,857.0 242,203.7 100 100 74,9 89.8 
Sources: IMF-World Bank Mission (1979), Tables 1 and 2, Commercial bank by category, Appendix Tables; Central Bank Fact llook (1980), Philippine
Statistical Yearbook (1981). - --
Notes: * indicate government financial institutions. 
Commercial bank data by category are slightly different from the total since the data are from a different source;· accordingly ratios are 





























Table J Inflation, Interest Rates and Real Interest Rates 
Savin~osits Time De£os1ts Money Market Rates d Ceiling
 Lending Rate 
e 
Rate of Interest Real Tn- Interest Rate0
 Real Nominal Real c Nominal Real
(360 days) Interest Ratec Interest RateInflation
8 Rateb terest Ratec 
14 14.9
-0.9 3.0 3,9 3.5 4.4 14 9,8
4.2 3.0 -1.2 3.5 -0.7 14 12.4
1.6 3.0 1.4 3,5 1.9 14 8.2
5.8 3.0 -2.8 3,5 -2.3 
5.6 3.5 -2.1 4.5 -1.1 
14 8.4
14 5.8
8.2 3.5 -4.7 4.5 -3.7 14 11.4
2.6 4.0 1.4 5.0 2.4 14 8.6
5.4 5.15 o. 35 6.5 1.1 
6.3 5.75 -0.55 6.5 0.2 11.6 5.3
 14 7.7 
4,1 12.1 9,7 14 11.62.4 5.75 3.35 6.5 
5.0 13. 7 11.7 14 12.02.0 6.0 4.0 7.0 13.6 -0. 7 14 -0.314. 3 6,0 -8.3 7.0 -7.3 12.7 -2.0 14 -0.714.7 6.0 -8.7 7.0 -7.7 14. 3 4.0 14 3. 7 
10.3 6.0 -4.3 7.0 -3.3 
7.0 -4.0 9.2 -1.8 14 3,0 I
V,11.0 6.0 -5.0 
34.5 6.0 -28.5 9.5 -25,0 
17.6 -16.9 14 -20.5 ....
I
9,5 1. 3 15,0 6.8 14 5.88.2 6.0 -2.2 
10,0 3.9 12.9 6.8 14 7.96.1 7.0 0.9 14 6.1
7.9 7.0 -0.9 10.0 2.1 
12.6 4.7 
2.4 10.7 3.1 14 6.47.6 7.0 -0.6 10.0 -2.812.9 -5.9 16
18.8 1.0 -11.8 10.0 
-8.8 
13.3 -4.S 16' -1.8
9.0 -8.8 14.0 -3.817.8 
Tan (1979.), Tables 6, 7; Central Bank Statistical Bulletin and Philippipe FiygcialIMF-World Bank Mission Report (1979), Tables 13, 31; 
Stati ■ tica.
a:--Heasured by changes in the consumer price index. 
b. Rates offered by COIDl!rcial banks, rates by other financial institutions were generally 0.
5% higher since July 29, 1974, 
The real interest rate is defined as the nominal interest rate minus the rate of inflation. 
d.
c. 
These are t~e published rates: actual rates are considerably higher, In relativelv thin marke
ts, inter••~ r ■ te■ fluctuate widely: 
for thi ■ re1son aonthly averages, m11ch leas the annual avera~es given in tn1a teo~•, ar• •-wu
at ..u.•!•...i..a, 
•• The maxiaua rate for unsecured loans under the Usury Law until re,eal, then Central Bank 
ceiling. 
Table 4. The Private nomestf.c Banks: Establishment, Assets. Branches, Group Affil:lation 
NAME OF BANK COMMON 
(by size of ~BBREVIATION 
Total Assets) 
1980 
1 I ALLIED BANKING All -led 
COP.!'ORATIO~• 
GENERAL BANK & 
TRUST COMPANY Gcnbank 




& I People's 
3 METROPOLITAN BANK 
& TRUST COMPANY 
I Metro bank 
4 REPUBUC PLANTERS RPB 
BANK 
REPUBLIC BANK Republic: 
s I PHILIPPINE COMMER- PCIB 




BANKING I Merchants 
PHIL, BANK OF COM~ I Connnerce 
MERCE 
61 UNITED COCONUT 
PLANTERS BANK 
I UCPB 
FIRST ITNITED BANK FUR 
7 FAR EAST BANK & FEBTC 
TRUST COMPANY 
BANK HISTORY 
Tak~ovcr of Assets and Linbilitfes 
of General Bank & Trust Co.; 
opened June 1, 1977 after Genbank 
was declared insolvent and ordered 
closed by the Central Bank on 
March 25, 1977 
Established September 7, 1963 
Establish~d August 1,1851; 
mereed with People's Bank May 2Cl,l.971-
Established November 1, 1926. 
Established September 7, 1962 
Formerly Republic Bank; Name 
changed after equity acquired by 
sugar bloc May 16, 1978 
Est abl ished .January 5, !}61 
Merger of PCIB, Merchants Banking 
Corporation and Philippine Bank of 
Commerce, March 23, 1976; PCIB 
established February 8, 1960 
Established September 3, 1963 
Established July 8, 1938 
Formerly FIRST UNITED BANK; Name 
changed to UCPB August 12, 1975 
after the Phil. Coconut Producers 
Federation acquired equity in the 
bank pursuant to Presidential 
Decree No. 755 
Established May 16, 1963 














J. Antonio /1.raneta 
Grind lays 
(Subsequently sold) 







George S. K. Ty 
(Elizalde) 
Benedicto 
















Chemical Bank of New York 






Table 4 (continued) 
NAME OF BANK 














8 I TRADERS ROYAL BANK Traders Formerly Traders CoD'lllercial Bank 
Name changed to Traders Royal Bank, 
April 1, 1974 after Royal Bank of 
Canada acquired equity in the bank 
Benedicto 
Africa 







Established June 18, 1963 Jose Africa, Chair-
man Hontellbano 
9 I RIZAL COMMERCIAL 
BANKING CORPORATION 






Finance Corp. Ltd. 





10 I CHINA BANKING 
CORPORATION 
I China Established August 16, 1920 
Reopened July 23, 1945 
Deck-Chiong 
SyCip 
Sanwa Bank of Japan 33.0% Japanese 
11 I PACIFIC BANKING 
CORPORATION 
Pacific Established June 23, 1955 
Merged with Progressive Commercial 




COMMERCIAL.BANK Progressive! Established Hay 3, 1962 Pastor Endencia 
Jorge Araneta 
12 I THE MANILA 
BANKING CORP, 
Manilabank I Established January 20, 1961 Cabarrus 






13 l CONSOLIDATED 
BANKING CORP, 
Solidbank Established July 19, 1963 Madrigal 
14 EQUITABLE BANK­
ING CORPORATION 
Equitable Established September 20, 1950 Trinidad 
Tomulo 
Citibank 40% American 
15 I PHILIPPINE BANK 
OF COMMUNICATIONS 
PBCom Established September 4, 1939 Nubla-
Ang Beng Uh 
16 I INSULAR BANK OF 
ASIA AND AMERICA 
IBAA Merger of Bank of Asia and First 
Insular Bank of Cebu, January 1, 
1974 
Kalaw Bank of America 
(subsequently sold) 





BANK OF ASIA Asia Established October 15, 1963 Kalaw 
FIRST INSULAR 
BANK OF CEBU 
First 
Insular 
Established January 23, 1961 Avoitiz 
17 SECURITY BANK 
I, TRUST CO. 
Security Established June 18, 1951 Cy, Ang The Bank of Nova Scotia 29.5% Canadian 
18 I COMMERCIAL BANK 
& TRUST CO. 
Comtrust Established September 20, 1954 Ayala (purchased 
from Marquez) 
The Chase Manhattan Bank, 
N.A. (subsequently sold) 
30.0% 
Table 4 (continued) 
NAME OF BANK 









NAME OF FOREIGN INVESTOR E0UITY NATIONALITY 
19 PHILIPPINE BANKING Philbanking Established September 2, 1957 Laurel 
CORP. Ortigas-Villanueva 
20 PRUDENTIAL BANK Prudential Established July 2, 1952 Santos 
21 INTERNATIONAL COR-
PORATE BANK 
Interbank Formerly Continental Bank 
Reopened September 19, 1977 
Herd ls:, Group
l: 
CONTINENTAL BANK Continental Established April 17 • 1963, its Munoz, Chairman 
closure was authorized by the 
President of the Phils. upon 
Central Bank recommendation on 
June 24, 1974 w/ takeover of its 
assets by the Central Bank 
22 ASSOCIATED Associated Merger of Associated Banking Corp. Leonardo K. Ty 
CITIZENS Citizens and Citizens Bank, October 14, 
1975 
ASSOCIATED Associated Established February 8, 1965 Ty. Recto 
BANKING CORP. 
CITIZENS BANK & Citizens Established October 4, 1962 Arambulo, President 
TRUST COMPANY 
23 CITY TRUST City Trust Formerly Feati Bank & Trust Co. Madrigal
Brimo First National City Bank 32.3% American I u 
FEAT! BANK & Feat! Established November 7, 1961 Araneta "I 
TRUST COMPANY 
24 PRODUCERS' BANK 
OF THE PHIL. 
Producers Established July 6, 1971 Co Bun Chun 
Henry L. Co. 
25 FILIPINAS Filipinas Merger of Pilipinas Bank and 
Manufacturers Bank December 29, 
Silverio; PNB major!~ 
shareholder from 198 
1975; name changed May 7, 1980 
from Filipinas.,Manufacturers 
FILIPINAS BANK Filipinas Established October 5, 19 Echaus, Chairman 
& TRUST CO, 
MANUFACTURERS BANK Manufac- Established August JO, 1957 De las Alas, Chairman 
& TRUST CO. turers 
26 PHILIPPINE TRUST Phil. Trust Established June ·1, 1964 Emilio Yap 
COMPANY Ramos 
27 OVERSEAS BANK OF Overseas Established January 6, 1964 
MANILA under Central Bank supervision 
starting November 1967 until 
operations suspended by CB 
Monetary Board August 1, 1968 





Private C:C-ercial Banks Cludfiad by Manage-at Style and Type 




Aa•ociated Citisana Camtrustl! 




Phil. Trust PCIBf 
Producers Prudential 
Traders Royale,f,gPrudential 
Republic Planterse Solidbank 
Traders Royale Filipino-ChineseUCPBe 
Alliedf
Intermediate Aasociated Citizens 


















The "management atyle" claHification is based on interviews in 
1979 and 1980. Some infonaed observora would place certain banks 
in a different category. 
Olmerahip type: Katigbak, ("3 Classes of Banks," April 2. 1979). 
a: Thia is a loose cluaification indicating roughly the degree 
to which the bank i• aanaged in a traditional, often faaily 
atyle by ovnera, by professional aanagers hired by the owners, 
or in some intermediate position. 
b: "The Anakbayan banu ••• are where the Filipino f&lllilies can 
trace their heritage and faailies way back" in the Philippines. 
c: hnks which have a a.inority foreign ownerahip; China Bank and 
Equitable also have foreign participation (see Table 6). 
d: "This column considers Republic Planters Bank and the United 
Coconut Planters Bank as quasi-government banks, apparently 
due to their sources of funds. 
e: Apparently controlled by a single individual. 
f: "'Political hanks," considered close to the government 






Tal>la 6. let -• -to --• lalacc.d 'IMnlult UNU. LiallilU'9o• ....-u■ -
TOT.II. UiltLln~!OTAL ASR'l'S 
lW(! o, -
~ (lllalll--)
~ (1D .uu.... -) 
1980 1978 1973 1968 1965 l.MO lf71 1'73 1'68 1'65 lNO lt78 1'73 1
'68 ltBO 1978 1973 1968 
Pl.IVA!!: DCl!ESTIC 
1 3 ,.101., >.423.43 7.156.9 3.709.31 Allied 1 125.6 l0.1
c...banl< 14 26 24 
670.5 fl.I 55.9 14 25 
4 6,441.7 4.442.0 1.w.2 3tl.9 221.5 2 1 4 5.924.3 ,,ou.3 695.5 345.62 IPl 2 1 2 4 
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Table 8. Commercial Bank Credit Outstanding, Selected Features 
(September 1978, 1979, and 1980) (in percent) 
A. Distribution by Sector 
All industries 
Agriculture, Fishery and Forestry 
Mining and Quarrying 
Manufacturing 
F.lectricity, Gas and Water 
Construction 
Trade 
Transport, Storage and Communication 
Financing, Insurance and Business 
Services 
Real Estate 
Community, Social anJ Personal Services 




1 c. Distribution by Stated Interest Rate 
More than 14% 
14% 
12-13% 
Less than 10% 

















































































Source: Central Bank of the Philippines, Statistical Bulletin, and Philippine 
Financial Statistics, 1978, 1979, and 1980. 
Note: Data include government and foreign as well as private domestic commercial 
banks. 
1The interest rate ceiling was 12% on secured loans, 14% on unsecured. 
Table 9 • Total Credits Outstanding of Private Connnercial Banks
Classified by Size of Firm 
(million pesos)
Amount
Size of Firma As of Oct. 31 
Distribution
(percent)
1979 1978 1979 1978 
Total 43,227.2 34,268.0 100.0 100.0 
Cottage industry 1,267.2 2,099.7 3.0 6.1(less than 100) 
Small-scale enterprises 3,019.0 4,256.1 7.0 12.4
(100 - 1,000) 
Medium-scale enterprises 
I
4,205.0 4,066.5 9.7 11.9 °'?(1,000 - 4,000) 
Large-scale enterprises 27,464.9 15,353.7 63.5 44.8
(more than 4,000) 
Others-unknown 7,271.1 8,492.0 16.8 24 .8 
Source: Central Bank 
Note: Excluding PNB, past due items, items in litigation, domestic and foreign bills-clean.
a: amount of assets, in 1,000 pesos. 
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Table 10. Credits Outstandings by Financial Institutions by Maturity 
As of December 31, 1977 
(Million pesos) 
Intermediate 
Short Term Term Long Term 
% of % of % of 

































































































Percentage of Total: Short term 
Intermediate 
Long term 
Source: IMF-World Bank Mission Report (1979, Table 22, p.43). 
Note: While data are not fully consistent the following definitions 
are used: short-term, up to one year; intermediate-term, from 
one to five years; long-term, five years or more. 
a: Land Bank of Philippines and Philippine Amanah Bank. 
*: Government financial institutions, but not 
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